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INTRODUCTION

A circuit split exists between the Second and Fourth Circuits
regarding the correct standard of care to be applied under the maritime
rescue doctrine.1 This is an important issue because the rescue doctrine
functions as a response to the defense of contributory negligence and the
standards used under the doctrine thereby affect the rescuer’s ability to
recover damages for his or her injuries.2 The federal judiciary has supplied
much of admiralty’s substantive law. Although portions of the admiralty
common law have been provided by the Supreme Court, a consensus of
lower federal court decisions constitutes nearly all of the prevailing law in
this area.3 Given the importance of the lower federal courts in admiralty
law, the existence of a circuit split involving admiralty torts is both
intriguing and troubling—intriguing because of the aforementioned,
crucial role these courts play, and troubling because the circuits on either
side of the split fail to consider the best possible solution born out of
compromise.
In Barlow v. Liberty Mar. Corp., the Second Circuit chose to apply
a reasonableness standard in maritime injury cases, essentially retiring the
rescue doctrine in the admiralty context.4 In Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge
& Dock Co. (Furka I), the Fourth Circuit decided to apply a reckless and
wanton standard to the rescuer’s conduct5; and in Furka v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co. (Furka II), the Fourth Circuit chose to apply a reckless
and wanton standard to the rescuer’s perception of the emergency
situation.6
This article, argues that the rescue doctrine should be modified to use
a bifurcated standard: a reasonableness standard for the perception aspect
of the rescue doctrine and a reckless and wanton standard for the conduct
aspect of the rescue doctrine. Therefore, this article disagrees with both
sides of the circuit split, discussed in detail below, and instead suggests
that a hybrid solution is the best reform option.
Part II explains the necessary background with regard to the principle
cases and major concepts involved. Part III provides critical analysis,
including justifications for borrowing from terrestrial torts to solve an
1 Barlow v. Liberty Mar. Corp., 746 F.3d 518, 526 (2d Cir. 2014); Furka v. Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Furka I];
Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 824 F.2d 330, 331 (4th Cir. 1987) [hereinafter
Furka II].
2 Barlow, 746 F.3d at 524.
3 W. Eugene Davis, The Role of Federal Courts in Admiralty: The Challenges Facing
the Admiralty Judges of the Lower District Courts, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1355, 1357–58 (2001).
4 Barlow, 746 F.3d at 529.
5 Furka I, 755 F.2d at 1088.
6 Furka II, 824 F.2d at 332.
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admiralty tort issue. This portion of the article contains arguments in favor
of a reckless conduct standard, as proposed in Furka I, as well as,
arguments in favor of a reasonable perception standard, which was
implicitly accepted by the court in Barlow. Part III also provides a
discussion of how Good Samaritan statutes adopted throughout the
country appear to mirror the article’s proposed bifurcated standard. Part
IV concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Contributory Negligence or Fault
The accepted definition of contributory negligence is “[c]onduct on
the part of the plaintiff which falls below the standard of conduct to which
he should conform for his own protection, and which is a legally
contributing cause cooperating with the negligence of the defendant in
bringing about the plaintiff’s harm.”7 In general, the old rule was that “the
plaintiff’s contributory negligence bars recovery against a defendant
whose negligent conduct would otherwise make him liable to the plaintiff
for the harm sustained by [the plaintiff].”8 Yet, comparative negligence
has now generally replaced the use of contributory negligence as a total
bar to recovery.9
Generally under a comparative negligence regime, when a plaintiff
negligently causes their own injury, “the plaintiff’s recovery [reduces] in
proportion to the share of responsibility the factfinder assigns to the
plaintiff.”10 Therefore, comparative negligence only functions as a partial
bar to a negligent plaintiff’s recovery for their own injury, rather than as a
complete limitation.
B. The Common Law Rescue Doctrine
The maritime rescue doctrine functions as a response to a defendant’s
assertion of contributory fault as a defense.11 Under the doctrine, wouldbe rescuers can only be held contributorily accountable for injuries
incurred during a rescue attempt resulting from their own reckless and
wanton behavior.12 Therefore, under the rescue doctrine, a defendant
alleging contributory fault is required to show that the plaintiff-rescuer

7
8
9
10
11
12

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 463 (Am. Law Inst. 1965).
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 467 (Am. Law Inst. 1965).
Restatement (Third) of Torts § 7 (Am. Law Inst. 2000).
Id.
Barlow v. Liberty Mar. Corp., 746 F.3d 518, 524 (2d Cir. 2014).
Id.
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acted not only negligently, but recklessly, thereby providing the plaintiffrescuer with additional leeway with regard to his or her recovery.13
Through application of the doctrine, a rescuer, who suffers injury
while attempting to save an endangered party, may recover from a third
party whose negligent behavior created the peril.14 Additionally, if the
endangered party negligently caused the peril, the rescuer can potentially
recover from the endangered party.15 The rescue doctrine “is based upon
the principle that it is commendable to save life, and, although the person
attempting a rescue voluntarily exposes himself to danger, the law will not
impute to him responsibility for being injured while attempting such
rescue.”16 Consequently, this policy also referred to as the “humanitarian
doctrine,” “negate[s] the defense of assumption of risk.”17
Prior to the rescue doctrine’s application in maritime rescue cases,
the doctrine was traditionally used in terrestrial rescue cases; in fact, one
of the earliest discussions of the rescue doctrine appeared in Wagner v.
International R. Co., a terrestrial tort case involving a rescue attempt on
land.18 This is one reason courts ought to feel comfortable using terrestrial
tort cases to inform their choice of which standards to apply under the
maritime rescue doctrine.
C. The Circuit Split: Cases on Either Side
1. Creation of the Split: the Second Circuit’s Barlow v. Liberty
Mar. Corp.
George Barlow, the plaintiff-appellant in this case, had
approximately thirty-three years of experience working at sea prior to his
injury on the ship, the Liberty Sun.19 He had worked as a deck hand,
passed his merchant marine officer’s exam, licensing him “to serve as an
officer aboard U.S. flagged cargo vessels,” later received his master’s
license, the equivalent to a captain’s qualification, and spent his entire
career at sea aboard assorted vessels.20 Yet, at the time of the accident,
Barlow had no experience actually commanding a ship.21 In 2007, Barlow

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Id.
Fulton v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 675 F.2d 1130, 1133–34 (10th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 1134.
Wolff v. Light, 169 N.W.2d 93, 98 (N.D. 1969).
Commonwealth v. Millsaps, 352 S.E.2d 311, 311–12 (Va. 1987).
Wagner v. International R. Co., 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921).
Barlow v. Liberty Mar. Corp., 746 F.3d 518, 520 (2d Cir. 2014).
Id.
Id.
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took what would ultimately be his last job on a vessel, a position as third
mate on the cargo ship, Motor Vessel Liberty Sun.22
The incident instigating this lawsuit occurred two months after
Barlow began employment on the Liberty Sun.23 At the time of the
incident, the Liberty Sun was moored alongside a floating grain elevator
at a loading terminal in a Brazilian port on the Amazon River.24 Moreover,
a tug boat was positioned on the starboard bow of the Liberty Sun at all
times, in order “to fend the ship off the [loading] terminal.”25
The accident resulting in Barlow’s injury occurred three days after
the mooring of the vessel alongside the terminal.26 At that time, one of the
forward breast lines parted.27 The ship’s second mate was serving as “the
watch officer when the line parted.”28 Upon seeing the parted line, the
second mate immediately notified the ship’s captain, who subsequently
instructed him to assemble the crew and to reattach the line.29 The captain
next instructed the Chief Engineer to start the ship’s engine.30
The situation progressed from bad to worse when roughly five
minutes after the breast line parted, the starboard bow line parted.31 As
became evident later, whenever an additional line parted, the remaining
lines were placed under increased strain.32 At this point, the second mate
“noted that the remaining forward lines were also in danger of snapping,”
so he “ordered the boatswain to slacken the lines.”33 Based on the second
mate’s description of the events, the court understood him to mean that the
primary problem with the lines was that they were continuing to pay out
slowly, despite the fact that the brakes controlling the lines were
engaged.34 As the second mate and boatswain were handling the issue, the
rest of the crew assembled and “Barlow was the last crew member to arrive
on the scene.”35
22

Id.
Id.
24 Id. at 520–21. To partially control the ship’s movement, the Liberty Sun had six
lines securing it to mooring buoys: three lines forward, two lines aft, and one line off the
port quarter. Barlow, 746 F.3d at 521. The ship also had two starboard breast lines—lines
running perpendicular to the ship in order to control its distance from the pier—which were
connected to lines from the shore. Id.
25 Barlow, 746 F.3d at 521.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 522.
31 Barlow, 746 F.3d at 522.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
23

2017]

Maritime Rescue Doctrine

327

Despite being the last crew member on the ship to arrive, and
although outranked by the second mate, Barlow attempted to take charge
of the situation by first starting an argument with the second mate about
the best manner in which to slacken the line.36 In response to Barlow’s
actions, the second mate stated that other members of the crew were
dealing with the issue and ordered Barlow to do nothing.37 Thereafter,
Barlow tried to get the captain to intervene by unsuccessfully attempting
to call him on the ship’s telephone system.38 When this failed, Barlow
took matters into his own hands and addressed “one of the winches that
controlled the forward mooring lines.”39
The court noted that the standard protocol “for operating a winch is
to first start the motor,” before putting it in gear, and to only then release
the brake.40 This method ensures that one either pays out or takes in the
line using the motor as a means of controlling the speed at which the line
pays out.41 But, Barlow decided to use his own method, instead of
following protocol, which he called “bumping the brake.”42 This method
involved his “bump[ing]” the brake’s handle “to loosen the brake’s grip
on the winch,” without engaging the motor.43 He stated that in his mind,
“bumping the brake” would be quicker and save him from having to reach
underneath the winch, near the precariously taut line, to start the motor.44
However in reality, Barlow’s actions resulted in the line paying out
uncontrollably, whipping around the winch, and hitting him.45 After
sustaining this injury, Barlow remained on the Liberty Sun for a week and
received treatment locally.46 Nevertheless, his wound became infected,
forcing him to return home to the United States.47
In 2008, in the Eastern District of New York, Barlow brought this
action “against his employer, the Liberty Sun in rem, and the various
entities associated with its ownership, management, and operation, in
personam.”48 He asserted claims for damages under a theory of
negligence, as well as a claim of unseaworthiness against the owners of

36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Id.
Barlow, 746 F.3d at 522.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Barlow, 746 F.3d at 522.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the vessel.49 Before trial, as a response to Liberty’s claim that Barlow was
contributorily negligent, Barlow submitted proposed jury instructions
implementing the Fourth Circuit’s “maritime rescue doctrine.”50 He
argued that the rescue doctrine applied to him because in bumping the
brake he was trying to rescue the ship and its crew from the danger of the
parting lines.51 Under Barlow’s proposed instruction, the jury would be
required to find that his conduct rose to the level of “wanton and reckless”
behavior before it could assign any fault to him for his own injuries,.52
The district court rejected Barlow’s suggested instructions and
simply “gave an ‘emergency’ instruction” instead.53
Under this
instruction, the jury was told “to consider the fact that Barlow was in a
position where he must act quickly without opportunity for reflection, and
that it should hold him to the standard of a ‘reasonably prudent
[seaman] . . . faced with the same emergency.’”54 The case went to trial in
2011, resulting in a jury verdict in favor of Defendants on the
unseaworthiness claim, and a partial award of damages to Barlow on the
negligence claim.55 The jury found Defendants to be ten percent at fault,
thereby allocating ninety percent of the fault to Barlow.56 The jury totaled
damages at $446,000.57 Therefore, Barlow was to recover only ten percent
of the total damages, the portion of the damages allocable to Defendants—
$44,600.58
In Barlow, the Second Circuit stated that if the Fourth Circuit’s
approach were the law in the Second Circuit, it would have appropriately
given an instruction on the rescue doctrine.59 The Second Circuit
recognized that it has previously applied a regular negligence standard,
while also noting that the existence of an emergency was a factor to be
considered in determining damages.60 The court reasoned that because
comparative negligence applied, rather than contributory negligence, the
rescue doctrine’s principal purpose—to encourage rescue—largely
disappeared.61 Moreover, it stated that the Second Circuit’s precedent

49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

Barlow, 746 F.3d at 522.
Id.
Id. at 522–23.
Id.
Id. at 523.
Id.
Barlow, 746 F.3d at 523.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 525.
Id. at 526.
Barlow, 746 F.3d at 526.
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supported applying a reasonable person standard.62 The court ultimately
found “no reason to adopt Barlow’s” recklessness standard and instead
adopted a reasonable seaman standard, despite admitting that life on land
is generally less dangerous than life at sea.63
2. The Furka Cases From the Fourth Circuit
a. Furka I
Deborah Furka, the plaintiff-appellant and the administratrix of the
estate of Paul Furka, deceased, brought an action under the Jones Act, 46
U.S.C.S. § 30104,64 for negligence, and under general maritime law for
the unseaworthiness of the vessel Paul Furka was operating when he
perished.65 The case involved an alleged rescue attempt of a fellow
employee by the decedent on the Chesapeake Bay.66 Deborah Furka is the
widow of Paul Furka (hereinafter “Furka”), who was employed as a
surveyor “on a large marine dike construction project” near Baltimore at
Hart and Miller Islands in the Chesapeake Bay.67 The defendant, Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. (hereinafter “Great Lakes”), was Furka’s
employer.68 Furka held the position of “chief-of-party on the surveying
team operating on a Boston Whaler.”69
On a January day in 1982, a day of progressively rough weather and
turbulent seas, one tug with a scow went adrift in the bay after losing its
rudder and power.70 Thereafter, the captain of the tug radioed the base.71
The subject matter of this transmission is a matter of dispute;72 according
to plaintiff, the captain requested the removal of the scowman from his
open boat, where he was “freezing to death,” due to being wet and cold.73
Defendant’s evidence, contrarily, suggested that the captain did not hint at
an emergency, but simply requested assistance with the scow.74

62

Id.
Id.
64 The Jones Act allows a seaman, who is “injured in the course of employment,” or
the personal representative of a seaman, who dies from such injuries, to bring a civil suit
against the seaman’s employer. 46 U.S.C.S. § 30104 (LexisNexis 2016).
65 Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir. 1985)
[Furka I].
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Furka I, 755 F.2d at 1087.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
63
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At the time of the captain’s call, no larger boats were available to
rescue the disabled craft.75 Therefore, Furka took his sixteen-foot Boston
Whaler into the rough water to save the scowman from the cold.76 But
when Furka arrived at the scow, the stranded seaman refused to leave the
boat.77 Furka then turned towards shore, and shortly thereafter began
taking on water.78 He radioed for assistance, but drowned before rescuers
arrived.79 As mentioned previously, Great Lakes denied the existence of
any urgency to the tugboat captain’s call for help and claimed contributory
negligence as a limitation against full recovery.80
Following trial, the jury found that Furka qualified as a seaman and
returned a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor on the negligence claim.81 The
jury’s verdict favored the defendant on the unseaworthiness claim.82 The
jury awarded $1,200,000 in damages for pecuniary loss, but limited
Furka’s recovery by finding him to have been 65% contributorily
negligent.83 Therefore, judgment was entered for the plaintiff in the
amount of $420,000.84 Mrs. Furka appealed that verdict.85
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit stated that the trial court’s jury
instruction “failed to inform the jury that no contributory negligence may
be inferred from a rescue attempt alone and further that no comparative
fault may be assessed unless plaintiff’s conduct was wanton or reckless.”86
The Fourth Circuit summarized the common law rescue doctrine stating,
“[t]he law has so high a regard for human life that it will not impute
negligence to an effort to preserve it, unless made under such
circumstances as to constitute rashness.”87 The court acknowledged that
the rescue doctrine developed when contributory negligence was the rule,
but nevertheless concluded that admiralty law must be very hospitable to
a man’s impulse to rescue.88 The court additionally noted that in an
75

Id.
Id.
77 Furka I, 755 F.2d at 1087.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 1087–88.
81 Id. at 1088.
82 Id.
83 Furka I, 755 F.2d at 1088.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. (citing Scott v. John H. Hampshire, Inc., 246 Md. 171 (1967) (quoting Maryland
Steel Co. v. Marney, 88 Md. 428 (1898)). See also Altamuro v. Milner Hotel, Inc., 540 F.
Supp. 870 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Brown v. National Oil Co., 233 S.C. 345 (1958); Andrews v.
Appalachian Electric Power Co., 192 Va. 150 (1951) (noting that an elevated regard for
human life led to the adoption of a rash or reckless conduct standard).
88 Furka I, 755 F.2d at 1088–89.
76
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emergency, a rescuer should not be punished for judgment errors, given
the fact that confusion is a natural product of an urgent situation.89
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit highlighted how the law wants to
encourage swift responses stating that “[i]n rescue, promptness may be
prudence,” and explained that using a reckless conduct standard
importantly reflects the public policy purpose behind the rescue doctrine.90
The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the case holding that the
lower court’s jury instruction regarding contributory negligence was plain
error, since it did not reference the unique context of rescue.91
b. Furka II
At the second trial, the court instructed the jury that “the decedent
was not at fault if he believed that a rescue was required and if a reasonably
prudent person would have perceived the need for a rescue.”92 The parties
agreed to a special verdict form placing two questions before the jury: (1)
whether a rescue situation existed, and if so, (2) whether the plaintiffrescuer’s behavior during the rescue was wanton or reckless.93 The judge
told the jury that in deciding whether a rescue situation manifested they
should consider the following: (1) “did Mr. Furka perceive the need for a
rescue?” and (2) “if so, was there cause based on all the surrounding
circumstances for a reasonably prudent person to have perceived the call
to rescue and thereby launch the effort of the attempt?”94
The jury answered the first special verdict query in the negative,
finding that no rescue situation existed in this case.95 Since the jury found
that no rescue situation existed, the first jury’s finding that the decedent
negligently contributed to his injuries was adopted.96 Therefore, following
the second trial, Mrs. Furka was again awarded damages of $420,000,
reduced through the application of comparative negligence.97
Mrs. Furka once again appealed to the Fourth Circuit, arguing that
the trial court erred by instructing the jury to apply a reasonable person
standard to the perception aspect of the rescue, and that the reckless and

89 Id. at 1088 (citing Corbin v. Philadelphia, 195 Pa. 461 (1900)). See also Rodgers v.
Carter, 266 N.C. 564 (1966); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 470(1) (Am. Law Inst. 1965)
(recognizing the rapid decision making that results from an emergency).
90 Furka I, 755 F.2d at 1088–89.
91 Id. at 1089.
92 Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 824 F.2d 330, 331 (4th Cir. 1987) [Furka
II].
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
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wanton standard should have been applied to both facets of the rescue
doctrine—the rescuer’s actions and the rescuer’s perception of the need
for a rescue attempt.98 On appeal, Great Lakes conceded that Furka’s
conduct must be evaluated under a reckless and wanton standard, however,
the company contended that Furka’s “perception of the need for a rescue
should be measured against that of a reasonably prudent person,” pointing
to instances in the terrestrial tort context when a bifurcated standard has
been applied.99
In response, the Fourth Circuit stated its belief that bifurcating the
rescue doctrine would trivialize it.100 Citing Wagner, the court asserted
that in the context of rescue, perception and response are inseparable
because both will be undertaken against the same backdrop of stress and
imperfect knowledge.101 The court declared that bifurcating the standard
“is to have angels dancing . . . on the head of the proverbial pin.”102
Consequently, the Fourth Circuit held that the wanton and reckless
standard is the correct standard to be applied under the rescue doctrine, in
admiralty, for both the perception of the need to rescue and the rescuer’s
conduct.103
3. Other Circuits involved in the Split
In Wharf v. Burlington N. R.R., the Ninth Circuit explicitly sided with
the Fourth Circuit on the appropriate standard to be applied to a rescuer’s
conduct.104 After finding that the plaintiff-rescuer suffered injury in
connection with his rescue attempt, the court applied the wanton and
reckless conduct standard under the rescue doctrine, citing Furka I.105 The
Ninth Circuit then further explained that the evidence merely showed that
the plaintiff-rescuer “tripped while looking away from his direction of
travel,” which “could constitute negligence,” but “does not amount to
reckless or wanton” behavior.106
D. Terrestrial Tort Rescue cases and Good Samaritan Statutes
In the context of rescue on dry land, some jurisdictions appear to
follow the Second Circuit’s approach by applying reasonableness
standards to both the perception and conduct aspects of the rescue
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106

Furka II, 824 F.2d at 331.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 332.
Id.
Id.
Wharf v. Burlington N. R.R., 60 F.3d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1995).
Id.
Id.
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doctrine.107 For instance, the Appellate Court in Connecticut stated that
since contributory negligence is no longer a total bar to recovery, it
believed the rescue doctrine does nothing more to aid injured rescuers in
their attempts to recover damages than to help establish the causal
connection between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s
injury.108 Yet, other jurisdictions take a different approach.
A bifurcated standard has been used under the rescue doctrine in a
variety of cases involving torts which occurred on dry land.109 A
bifurcated standard refers to the idea that the rescue doctrine has two
separate aspects: a perception aspect and a conduct aspect.110 In these
terrestrial tort cases utilizing such a split standard, a reasonableness
standard is applied to the perception aspect, while a recklessness standard
is applied to the conduct aspect.111 Such a bifurcated approach was taken
at the second trial following Furka I.112
The terrestrial tort cases using the bifurcated standard encompass a
wide array of emergencies, exemplifying its versatility. The factual
situations under which it was applied include: when a car drove through
the front window of a commercial structure,113 when a boy on a bicycle
was hit by a car,114 when a car rolled down a driveway and into a ravine,115
and following an incident when a state trooper endeavored to create a
roadblock to stop a speeding motorist from evading the authorities.116

107 See Ryder Truck Rental v. Korte, 357 So. 2d 228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978);
Sweetman v. State Highway Dep’t, 357 N.W.2d 783 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Beatty v.
Davis, 400 N.W.2d 850, 855 (Neb. 1987); Hughes v. Murnane Bldg. Contrs., Inc., 932
N.Y.S.2d 782, 784 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011); Calvert v. Ourum, 595 P.2d 1264, 1267 (Or.
Ct. App. 1979); French v. Chase, 297 P.2d 235, 239 (Wash. 1956).
108 Zimny v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 513 A.2d 1235, 1243 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986).
109 See Dinsmoore v. Board of Trustees of Memorial Hosp., 936 F.2d 505, 507 (10th
Cir. 1991); Solgaard v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 491 P.2d 821, 825 (Cal. 1971); Walker
Hauling Co. v. Johnson, 139 S.E.2d 496, 499 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964); Padilla v. Hooks Int’l,
Inc., 654 P.2d 574, 578 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982); Skaling v. Aetna Ins. Co., 799 A.2d 997
n.11 (R.I. 2002); Ouellette v. Carde, 612 A.2d 687, 690 (R.I. 1992); Commonwealth v.
Millsaps, 352 S.E.2d 311,313 (Va. 1987); Dubus v. Dresser Indus., 649 P.2d 198, 206
(Wyo. 1982).
110 See Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 824 F.2d 330, 331 (4th Cir. 1987)
[Furka II].
111 See Dinsmoore, 936 F.2d at 507; Solgaard., 491 P.2d at 825; Walker Hauling Co,
139 S.E.2d at 499; Padilla, 654 P.2d at 578; Skaling, 799 A.2d 997 n.11; Ouellette, 612
A.2d at 689–90; Millsaps, 352 S.E.2d at 313; Dubus,, 649 P.2d 1 at 206.
112 Furka II, 824 F.2d at 331.
113 Wolff v. Light, 169 N.W.2d 93, 95–96 (N.D. 1969).
114 Marks v. Wagner, 370 N.E.2d 480, 482 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977).
115 Simmons v. Carwell, 10 So. 3d 576, 578 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008).
116 Commonwealth v. Millsaps, 352 S.E.2d 311, 504 (Va. 1987).
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Good Samaritan statutes protect people who choose to aid others who
are injured.117 Historically, such laws have been intended to decrease the
hesitation of bystanders to help an injured party.118 Bystander hesitation
often results from fear of suit or prosecution for unintentional injury or
wrongful death.119 Good Samaritan statutes vary from state to state.
Although certain states impose an affirmative obligation on people to
provide assistance to injured parties, if they can do so without placing
anyone in peril, the majority of states do not impose such an obligation.120
Instead, most states provide protection from civil and/or criminal liability
to anyone who provides assistance to injured parties, provided that all the
statutory requirements are met.121
Despite the variations in Good Samaritan laws, such statutes
typically contain three basic requirements: (1) the rendering of emergency
aid; (2) in good faith; and (3) rendered gratuitously.122 The standard of
care for those voluntarily providing emergency assistance may vary by
jurisdiction. Despite some variation among jurisdictions, the applicable
standards of care are relatively lenient in accordance with the altruistic
purpose of Good Samaritan laws.123
E. Maritime Law’s Historically Generous Provision of Seaman’s
Remedies
Historically, seamen have been provided with a variety of remedies
for their worker injury claims. They consequently fared better than their
land-based counterparts, whose claims against their employers for workrelated injuries often failed.124 In large part, these claims failed because of
the doctrine of contributory negligence, which acted as a complete bar to
the plaintiff employee’s recovery if the plaintiff was found even slightly
117 See David Weldon, Comment, Forgotten Namesake: The Illinois Good Samaritan
Act’s Inexcusable Failure to Provide Immunity to Non-Medical Rescuers, 43 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 1097, 1105 (2010).
118 See id.
119 See Weldon, supra note 117, at 1103–05.
120 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2016) (imposing affirmative duty to aid
endangered person if capable of doing so safely); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 6801 (2016)
(no imposition of duty to aid); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-21, 186 (LexisNexis 2016) (no
imposition of duty to aid); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-04.1 (2016) (no imposition of duty
to aid).
121 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.090 (2016); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-1.5
(LexisNexis 2016); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-30-12-1 (LexisNexis 2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 20-9-4.1 (2016).
122 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-1.5 (LexisNexis 2016); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-30-12-1 (LexisNexis 2016); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12V (LexisNexis 2016);
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.151 (West 2016).
123 See Weldon, supra note 117, at 1105.
124 See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
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negligent.125 Even so, while contributory negligence functioned as a total
bar to recovery, seamen had the remedies of maintenance and cure, and
unseaworthiness available to them.126
In 1903, the Supreme Court noted that if a seaman falls ill or is
wounded while serving a ship, the vessel and its owners are liable for the
seaman’s maintenance and cure (akin to worker compensation) and for the
seaman’s wages, at least until the end of the voyage.127 The Court also
stated that the vessel and its owners are additionally liable to a seaman for
injuries the seaman sustains because of the unseaworthiness of the ship or
because of a failure to properly maintain the ship’s appurtenances.128
Therefore, even before Congress provided seamen the ability to bring a
negligence action against their employers based on the fault of coemployees or the employer’s own failures, seaman already had other
valuable remedies.
F. The Jones Act
This article pays special attention to the Jones Act, since both of the
principal cases on either side of the circuit split involve fact patterns ripe
for Jones Act claims. The Jones Act allows one qualified as a “seaman,”
who is injured in the course of employment, or the personal representative
of a “seaman” killed as a result of such injury, to launch a civil action at
law against their employer.129 Congress enacted the Jones Act leaving it
up to the courts, in large part, to fashion remedies for injured employees
in a manner analogous to tort remedies developed at common law.130
Moreover, although admiralty law generally denies a litigant the right to a
jury trial, Jones Act claims explicitly provide injured seamen “with the
right of trial by jury.”131
By extending the provisions of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act
(FELA) to apply to negligence claims brought by seamen against their
employers under the Jones Act, the Jones Act expresses that any of the
U.S.’s laws regulating a railway employee’s recovery for personal injury

125

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 467 (Am. Law Inst. 1965).
Osceola, 189 U.S. at 175.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 46 U.S.C.S. § 30104 (LexisNexis 2016). To qualify as a “seaman” under the Jones
Act employees must: (1) have duties that contribute to the accomplishment of a qualifying
vessel’s mission or to a qualifying vessel’s function, and (2) have a substantial connection,
in terms of its nature and its duration, to a navigating vessel. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515
U.S. 347 (1995).
130 Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 432 (1958).
131 46 U.S.C.S. § 30104.
126
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or death apply to seamen.132 Congress had previously adopted FELA,
which granted interstate railroad workers the ability to bring negligence
claims against their employers.133 FELA essentially held railroad
employers liable, through respondeat superior, for a co-employee’s
negligence causing injury to a fellow employee.134 Furthermore, it
abolished the defenses of assumption of risk and the fellow servant rules,
and stated that contributory negligence merely reduced recovery.135
III. ANALYSIS
A. Justifications for Borrowing from Terrestrial Torts
This article’s proposed solution to this circuit split is admittedly
novel, especially because it is founded upon the idea that one attempting
to resolve an admiralty tort issue can look outside the law of admiralty for
ideas and suggestions. Nevertheless, the idea of borrowing from terrestrial
tort law to develop a solution to this particular admiralty tort issue may not
appear unusual after one familiarizes himself with the following
considerations, including the aforementioned Jones Act and its
incorporation of FELA’s provisions.136
Outside of the Jones Act context, there exist a few other general
similarities between admiralty tort and terrestrial tort law. For example, it
appears that maritime law will follow the common law governing
intentional torts.137 Furthermore, many general maritime tort cases
involve theories of strict liability and negligence; general maritime law has
additionally borrowed from and supplied the general common law for torts
with regard to negligence. For instance, the famous “Learned Hand”
formula, which defines negligence, first appeared in a maritime case.138
Additionally, in both maritime tort and terrestrial tort cases, the element
of duty principally turns on the foreseeability of the risk.139 With regard to
the question of “breach,” which asks whether a defendant failed to act
reasonably, the maritime and common law approaches generally

132

Id.
45 U.S.C.S. § 51 (LexisNexis 2016).
134 See id.
135 See Beeber v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1364, 1373 (N.D. Ind. 1990)
(noting how contributory negligence does not act as a total bar to recovery under FELA).
136 46 U.S.C.S. § 34104.
137 See, e.g., Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 841 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding
that general maritime law recognizes the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress).
138 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
139 See, e.g., Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. C.F. Bean Corp., 833 F.2d 65 (5th Cir.
1987).
133
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coincide.140 Therefore, admiralty law’s historic borrowing from terrestrial
torts supports the notion of borrowing the bifurcated standard from the
common law of rescue and applying it to the maritime rescue doctrine.
B. In Support of a Recklessness Conduct Standard: Agreement with
Furka
1. Differences in Duty – Between Jones Act Employer & Rescue
Doctrine Plaintiff
Maritime law rejects the distinctions often drawn in common law
jurisdictions between “trespassers,” “licensees,” and “invitees,” and
instead imposes a duty of reasonable care to everyone lawfully aboard a
vessel, and upon the owner or operator of said vessel.141 This is
indistinguishable from the duty an employer owes his seamen, according
to at least one federal court that has addressed the matter.142 In Gautreaux
v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., the Fifth Circuit found that employer negligence
is the essence of a Jones Act claim, that such negligence is the failure to
exercise reasonable care under the circumstances, and that the employer
thereby owes a duty of reasonable care to their employees.143 Therefore,
Jones Act employers are held to a reasonable person standard.144 Bearing
this in mind, the logical conclusion is that a seaman rescuer ought to be
held to a different conduct standard—a standard other than
reasonableness—in part because of the lack of a duty.
As previously stated, Jones Act employers have an affirmative duty
to act with a certain level of care towards their employees.145 The Jones
Act holds employers liable for the negligence of any of its employees
through its incorporation of FELA.146 However, in order for this
negligence to be imputed to the employer, the negligence must be within
the scope and course of the offending party’s employment.147 Building on
the idea of control inherent in this conception of duty, the Supreme Court
has previously ruled that a Jones Act employer cannot delegate to a third
party, and thus escape liability for any act which is “a vital part of the

140 See In re Complaint of Paducah Towing Co., 692 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1982) (on the
issue of negligence, custom may be considered, although it is not conclusive).
141 Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630–31 (1959).
142 Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331, 335 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that
a duty of ordinary prudence or care is owed by employer to his employee-seaman).
143 Id.
144 See id.
145 Id.
146 46 U.S.C.S. § 30104 (LexisNexis 2016).
147 See Hopson v. Texaco, 383 U.S. 262, 263–64 (1966).
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ship’s total operations.”148 Therefore, it appears that the relevant inquiry
when determining whether a Jones Act employer owes a duty to a
particular party is the same inquiry that is used at common law generally,
i.e., did the defendant/employer maintain control over the way in which
the work was completed by the tortfeasor? If so, the employer is deemed
to have been in sufficient control of the tortfeasor and liability is imputed
to the employer.149
In contrast, even at sea, as in Barlow and the Furka cases, no
independent duty existed for the plaintiff employees to attempt rescues.150
Indeed, the voluntary nature of an attempted rescue is a key element of the
rescue doctrine’s application. The significance of the selflessness of the
rescue is illustrated in Ouellette v. Carde, where the Rhode Island Supreme
Court explained that the rescue doctrine was developed for two reasons:
(1) to encourage rescue (by those necessarily under no pre-existing duty
to help), and (2) to correct the inequity of barring relief under contributory
negligence “to a person who is injured in a rescue attempt which the
injured person was under no duty to undertake.”151 This lack of a duty
makes perfect sense because one employee typically exercises far less
control, if any, over a co-worker, as compared to an employer. Thus, given
the lack of a duty under the rescue doctrine, an injured rescuer employee’s
conduct should be held to a lower standard of care than that applied to an
employer’s conduct.
Nevertheless, it has been held that a Jones Act plaintiff does owe a
duty of reasonable care to someone—himself. In Gautreaux v. Scurlock
Marine, Inc., the Fifth Circuit held that the employee has a duty to utilize
reasonable care under the circumstances with regard to his own safety.152
Even if an employee is characterized as owing himself a duty, it remains
true that some rescuers, such as those plaintiffs involved on either side of
the split, did not have an affirmative duty to rescue the victims.153 Using
different standards of care for oneself and for others makes sense if one
148

Id.
See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.07 (Am. Law Inst. 2006) (discussing
employer’s vicarious liability when employee engages in a course of conduct subject to the
employer’s control).
150 Barlow v. Liberty Mar. Corp., 746 F.3d 518, 524 (explaining how the rescue
doctrine developed in part because courts were hesitant to punish volunteer rescuers).
There was no argument in either Barlow, or either of the Furka cases, that these
employee/plaintiffs had an affirmative duty to rescue.
151 Ouellette v. Carde, 612 A.2d 687, 689 (R.I. 1992).
152 107 F.3d at 336.
153 Barlow, 746 F.3d at 524–25 (stating how the rescue doctrine was created to protect
those who would voluntarily expose themselves to danger, in order to rescue others from
it and citing Furka I for the proposition that the law must encourage people to respond to
the plight of another in peril).
149
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considers the application of a lower standard of care to rescuer conduct a
sort of device used to incentivize the voluntary rescue of others.154
If a lower standard of care with regard to one’s conduct, such as a
recklessness standard, is employed in order to spur would-be-rescuers to
freely and selflessly undertake rescues155, it would make little sense to
apply this lower standard to self-preservation. Self-preservation is
arguably the most natural, and universally held, human instinct. Almost
anyone in their right mind will generally strive to save themselves within
reason. Therefore, the duty of care owed to oneself is a duty that does not
need to be promoted or incentivized in the same way that the law needs to
encourage people to voluntarily come to the aid of others. Hence, it is
logical to apply different standards of care to the saving of others and the
saving of oneself, given the inherent differences between selfless and
selfish behavior.
2. Barlow’s Approach: Thematically Inconsistent with the Jones
Act
Additionally, a plaintiff’s burden of proof with regard to causation
under the Jones Act reflects the statute’s apparent purpose—to place
increased responsibility on the employer and to allow the plaintiff
employee to recover with greater ease. The First Circuit has held that the
Jones Act plaintiff’s burden of proof on causation is “featherweight.”156
As a result, liability will be found to exist under this statute so long as the
employer’s negligence contributed to the seaman’s injury in the slightest
way.157 This burden of proof seems quite easy to carry.
The placement of this lower burden of proof on the Jones Act
plaintiff seems to comport with the statute’s purpose since it was enacted
“for the benefit and protection of seamen[,]” who are considered the
peculiar wards of admiralty, and since it was intended “to enlarge that
protection, not to narrow it.”158 The remedies afforded to seamen and their
dependents under this statute were designed to protect those who perform
services onboard vessels and are subsequently exposed to the unique
hazards of the sea.159 The Supreme Court has stated that this is a remedial
154 Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1089 (4th Cir. 1985)
[Furka I].
155 Id.
156 Poulis-Minott v. Smith, 388 F.3d 354, 366 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Gifford v. Am.
Canadian Caribbean Line, Inc., 276 F.3d 80, 83 n.2 (1st Cir. 2002).
157 Id.
158 The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 123 (1936). See also Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S.
207, 210 (1955).
159 See Mahramas v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 165, 170 (2d
Cir. 1973).
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statute intended to be liberally construed, in order to further its purpose of
protecting its wards.160 Consequently, a hybrid solution to the circuit split,
which increases the likelihood of full recovery of damages for an injured
rescuer-plaintiff in the maritime context, reflects the purpose and
construction of the Jones Act, while Barlow’s full adoption of the
reasonableness standard conflicts with the act.
3. Criticism of Barlow: Ignoring the Rescue Doctrine’s Public
Policy Purpose
It proves problematic that in Barlow, the Second Circuit centers its
discussion on contributory negligence. In Barlow, the court focuses too
much on the fact that contributory negligence is no longer a total bar to
recovery. It states that “[u]nder the district court’s jury charge, a rescuer
may be held liable for actions that were merely unreasonable under the
circumstances.”161 The Second Circuit chose to adopt the district court’s
standard of care.162 Through the court’s adoption of reasonableness as the
standard of care to be applied to all aspects of the rescue doctrine, the court
effectively retired the rescue doctrine (at least in the maritime context).
This characterization of the court’s decision in Barlow, as essentially
retiring the rescue doctrine, is supported by the fact that the court focuses
in large part on only one of the two purposes underlying the formation of
this common law doctrine. The purpose it chose to center on was
contributory negligence’s function as a complete bar to recovery when the
rescue doctrine initially developed.163
After the Second Circuit announced its choice to adopt a reasonable
person standard, the next paragraph of the court’s opinion discussed how
Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century courts generally assumed, with
regard to contributory negligence, that courts should “let losses lie where
they fell” in instances “where both parties were blameworthy.”164 The
court then continued to center its attention on the fact that the rescue
doctrine was developed by courts as a method to mitigate the harshness of
contributory negligence as a total bar to recovery.165 It is true that the
doctrine helped avoid contributory negligence’s severe consequences by
carving out an exception to the rule. Yet, given all this attention to
contributory negligence, it appears that the Second Circuit primarily
160 Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 156 (1934). See also Chisholm v. CherokeeSeminole S.S. Corp., 36 F. Supp. 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
161 Barlow v. Liberty Mar. Corp., 746 F.3d 518, 524 (2d Cir. 2014).
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
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focused on the historical atmosphere under which the rescue doctrine
grew, without fully recognizing that the doctrine has a second, even greater
purpose behind it—the public policy purpose that prompted the creation
of the rescue doctrine in the first place.
In the Second Circuit’s defense, the court does appear to
acknowledge this underlying policy purpose as it does briefly mention that
“[a]lthough courts applying the doctrine of contributory negligence may
have been willing to deny recovery to a person whose negligence
precipitated an emergency, they hesitated before applying it to someone
who voluntarily exposed himself to danger in order to rescue others . . . to
protect would-be rescuers, courts created the rescue doctrine.”166 Despite
this acknowledgement, the Second Circuit fails to adequately emphasize
how general considerations of fairness compelled the creation of the
rescue doctrine.
The court does acknowledge, however, that the clearest articulation
of the rescue doctrine in the maritime context was provided by the Fourth
Circuit in Furka I and Furka II.167 Additionally, Barlow quotes the most
important passage of Furka I, which clearly establishes policy
considerations, such as the promotion of societal values, as the primary
reason for its adoption of the wanton and reckless conduct standard under
the rescue doctrine.168 In Furka I, the court held that the rescuer-decedent
“could not be found contributorily liable unless his rescue attempt was
wanton or reckless.”169 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that, “[t]he wanton
and reckless standard reflects the value society places upon rescue[s] as
much as any desire to avoid a total defeat of recovery under common law.
Law must encourage an environment where human instinct is not insular
but responds to the plight of another in peril.”170 Nonetheless, the Second
Circuit chose to ignore Furka I’s emphasis on the underlying public policy
purpose, in favor of concentrating its attention on the fact that times have
changed since the creation of the rescue doctrine.
Yet, encouraging voluntary rescues remains an extremely important
objective. The public policy goal of encouraging voluntary rescues when
life is endangered pervades American law. In Gardner v. Loomis
Armored, the court addressed the issue of “whether an employer
contravenes public policy when it terminates an at-will employee” for
violating a company regulation in order to assist a citizen in danger of

166
167
168
169
170

Id.
Barlow, 746 F.3d at 524.
Id. at 525.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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serious injury or death.171 There, the court reasoned that terminating even
an at-will employee for such a violation contradicted public policy because
the plaintiff-employee’s conduct unmistakably served the policy of
encouraging citizens to rescue others from death or serious injury.172 The
court also reasoned that if society has previously placed the rescue of
human life above the criminal code and constitutional rights, then this
employee’s conduct obviously trumps a company’s work rule.173 For
example, what would typically be an illegal use of force is lawful when
used to protect others or oneself from injury.174 Moreover, Fourth
Amendment protection from warrantless searches is waived under certain
exigent circumstances, such as when the search is essential to avoid
physical harm to officers or others.175 Thus, the court held that this rule
contravened public policy.176
The law has also pursued the related public policy goal of protecting
Good Samaritans.177 In State v. Hillman, the Washington Court of Appeals
held that the victim’s status as a “Good Samaritan,” who came to his
murderer’s aid, was a valid aggravating factor to consider during
sentencing.178 Reaching this conclusion, the court reflected that it “has
long been the policy of our law to protect the ‘Good Samaritan.’”179
Therefore, it is highly problematic that the Second Circuit chose to
emphasize the rescue doctrine’s ties to contributory negligence at the
expense of the public policy concerns underlying the doctrine.
4. Barlow’s Mistake Regarding Comparative Negligence
Moreover, Barlow mistakenly believes that comparative negligence
abrogates the rescue doctrine. The court praises the use of comparative
fault given that its application allows “even a negligent rescuer” to recover
something, as George Barlow did.180 Subsequently, because a rescuer will
still have a chance at partial recovery for her injuries, the Second Circuit
states, “the principle justification for the rescue doctrine—encouraging
rescue—has largely disappeared.”181 Yet, just because a reasonable
person standard combined with a comparative negligence regime will not
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181

Gardner v. Loomis Armored, 913 P.2d 377, 378 (Wash. 1996).
Id. at 386.
Id.
Id. at 384 (citing State v. Penn, 568 P.2d 797 (Wash. 1977)).
Id.
Id. at 386.
State v. Hillman, 832 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
Id.
Id.
Barlow v. Liberty Mar. Corp., 746 F.3d 518, 526 (2d Cir. 2014).
Id.
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automatically preclude a partially negligent rescuer from any recovery
whatsoever, does not mean that the need to encourage selfless behavior
during life’s most dangerous moments has diminished or disappeared. As
Furka I illustrates, encouraging voluntary assistance in the face of great
risk is a primary purpose behind the creation of the rescue doctrine;
otherwise courts would not have felt the need to form an exception to the
original contributory negligence rule in the first place.182 Courts would
not have “hesitated before applying [contributory negligence as a total bar
to recovery] to someone who voluntarily exposed himself to danger in
order to rescue others from it,” if they did not view would-be rescuers as
a special class deserving such a break.183
Barlow fails to adequately emphasize the fact that Furka I
acknowledged the change in law, the adoption of a comparative negligence
regime. The Second Circuit ends its discussion of Barlow’s negligence
claim by highlighting that “Furka admits, the rescue doctrine came from
a time when the rescuer’s slightest misstep could cost him any recovery
whatsoever. That is no longer the case.”184 Yet, the court does not point
out that the court in Furka I consciously adopted the wanton and reckless
conduct standard, regardless of this change, for a more important reason.
Tradition supports the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in favor of the
wanton and reckless conduct standard in Furka I. There, the court noted
that “[t]his is the standard [that has been] traditionally applied to the
conduct of plaintiffs in rescue situations.”185
Yet, despite the
persuasiveness of a long-standing tradition of using a lower standard of
care in the rescue context, the Fourth Circuit does not blindly follow
tradition without recognizing relevant changes that have been made in the
arena of apportioning fault. Rather, the court in Furka I considers the fact
that the reckless and wanton standard “developed under common law,
where contributory negligence was a complete bar to recovery,” and the
fact that “[i]n some comparative negligence jurisdictions, not in admiralty,
the wanton and reckless standard has thus been diluted.”186 Yet, it is
equally true that some jurisdictions adopting comparative negligence have
not diluted the rescue doctrine’s use of the reckless and wanton conduct
standard.
182 Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1089 (4th Cir. 1985)
[Furka I].
183 Barlow, 746 F.3d at 524.
184 Id. at 528.
185 Furka I, 755 F.2d at 1088. See, e.g., Scott v. John J. Hampshire, Inc., 246 Md. 171,
175 (1967) (applying standard of “dangerous but not reckless” behavior); Brown v.
National Oil Co., 233 S.C. 345, 357 (1958) (applying “wanton or foolhardy” standard);
Andrews v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 192 Va. 150 (1951).
186 Furka I, 755 F.2d at 1088–89.
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Several states, in a terrestrial tort context, have chosen to apply a
reckless and wanton conduct standard under the rescue doctrine, while also
adhering to comparative negligence systems.187 The Supreme Court of
Kansas reasoned that the rescue doctrine’s reckless conduct standard and
comparative negligence could co-exist since it remained sound policy to
promote rescue efforts.188 The court noted that using a heightened conduct
standard under the rescue doctrine, such as a reasonableness standard,
would “tend to operate as a deterrent to potential rescuers and penalize
acts which would constitute ordinary negligence, but would not rise to the
level of rash conduct.”189 The court wisely feared that such a holding
“would be one more weapon in the arsenal of the ‘don’t-get-involved’
creed of citizenship,” which the court found to be “already too
prevalent.”190 The court further reasoned that despite the state legislature’s
adoption of comparative negligence, it has continued to utilize a standard
of care lower than reasonableness in other statutes governing the handling
of emergencies, namely its Good Samaritan statutes, which result in less
liability for rescuers.191 The court also noted that the state’s Good
Samaritan statute has been frequently amended since comparative
negligence was implemented, so it is clear that the statute continues to
exist intentionally, and not as the result of oversight.192 Therefore, a
comparative negligence system does not prevent the use of limited liability
as an incentive for would-be rescuers faced with a crisis. Barlow
incorrectly concludes that the advent of comparative negligence
necessarily abrogated the rescue doctrine.
5. The Additional Hurdles Rescuer-Plaintiffs Must Face
Kansas is not alone in its dual adoption of comparative negligence
and a reckless conduct standard. Missouri has also shown that these two
concepts can co-exist.193 In Missouri, comparative negligence has
supplanted the rule of contributory negligence.194 The intention behind
this change was to eliminate the inherent inequality of a doctrine that
forced one party to take total responsibility for the conduct of both parties
187 See Solgaard v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 491 P.2d 821, 825 (Cal. 1971); Ouellette v.
Carde, 612 A.2d 687, 690 (R.I. 1992); Commonwealth v. Millsaps, 352 S.E.2d 311, 313
(Va. 1987); Dubus v. Dresser Indus., 649 P.2d 198, 206 (Wyo. 1982).
188 Bridges v. Bentley, 769 P.2d 635, 640 (Kan. 1989).
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 639–40.
192 Id.
193 Allison v. Sverdup & Parcel & Associates, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 440, 451 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987).
194 Id.
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involved.195 It could be argued that this is essentially what would occur
through the use of the bifurcated standard if an injured rescuer-plaintiff’s
conduct does not rise to the level of recklessness, thereby cutting him a
break and allowing him full recovery of damages. Yet, that result would
still be fair, although involving one party’s bearing the full responsibility
for the conduct of both parties, because the suggested standard only
applies in a narrow category of circumstances to a limited class of rescuers.
Thus, under the bifurcated standard, this seemingly inequitable result
remains fair because the defendant’s negligence must have caused the peril
that invites the rescue attempt.196 It is equitable to force the defendant to
bear more of the burden with regard to damages when it was the
defendant’s negligence that necessitated the injured rescuer’s involvement
in the first place.
In Missouri, the court noted how a defendant’s negligence remains a
prerequisite to a plaintiff’s recovery in this situation stating, “[t]o maintain
an action premised on the rescue doctrine, the plaintiff must allege that the
negligence of the defendant endangered the safety of another, and that the
plaintiff sustained injuries in an attempt to save the other from injury.”197
This statement not only demonstrates that a defendant’s negligence is one
of the initial hurdles a plaintiff must clear to avail himself of the rescue
doctrine, but that a particular sort of negligence must be committed by the
defendant, in order for a plaintiff to use the rescue doctrine.
Additionally, the court stated that two different standards can
potentially apply to rescuer conduct: an ordinary negligence standard if
the rescuer created the situation of peril prompting the rescue attempt, and
a rash or reckless standard if the rescuer was aiding another, without
having any involvement in the creation of the initial danger.198 This
distinction further demonstrates the importance of differentiating between
rescuers who create the emergency and those who do not. The Alabama
Supreme Court also emphasized how important it is for a plaintiff to
provide evidence of a defendant’s negligence.199 This is a basic
prerequisite to a plaintiff’s recovery on a negligence theory, however, as a
practical matter it functions as yet another hurdle that the plaintiff must
clear. The existence of multiple hurdles on the road to an injured rescuer’s
recovery further justifies carving out a narrow category where rescuers are
held to a lower conduct standard.

195
196
197
198
199

Id.
Id. at 454.
Id.
Id. at 451.
Trapp v. Vess, 847 So. 2d 304, 306 (Ala. 2002).
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Furthermore, application of a recklessness standard to the conduct
aspect of the rescue doctrine would minimize confusion. While choosing
to employ a reckless conduct standard under the rescue doctrine, despite
its acceptance of comparative negligence, the Court of Appeals in Georgia
noted how a reasonableness standard could promote confusion.200 The
court emphasized how the commonplace understanding of the phrase
“ordinary care” seems incongruent with a person’s voluntary placement of
themselves in harm’s way.201 The court also considered jury confusion a
possible byproduct of a reasonableness standard’s use in a rescue context,
since a jury would necessarily be told that “the rescue doctrine inherently
considers an assumption of risk as ingrained in the hazard created by the
defendant’s negligence,” eliminating assumption of risk as a defense under
the rescue doctrine.202 Consequently, a recklessness standard of care
seems the most natural and least confusing standard to apply to conduct in
the rescue context.
C. In Support of a Reasonable Perception Standard: Agreement with
Barlow
In Barlow, the Second Circuit perceptively states that “unreasonable
rescues injure people just as surely as the emergency that begets them . . . .
Indeed, under [Barlow’s proposed] rule, a defendant would be liable even
if no reasonable mariner would have even thought there was an
emergency, let alone taken the actions Barlow did.”203 Barlow proposed
applying the rescue doctrine as it is described by the Fourth Circuit in
Furka II. This article agrees with the Second Circuit that the Fourth
Circuit’s application of a recklessness standard to the perception aspect of
the rescue doctrine would pose a problem. As the Second Circuit clearly
stated above, application of the recklessness standard to one’s perception
of a situation would lead to easier recovery for even those plaintiffs who
involve themselves in what no reasonable seaman would possibly consider
an emergency situation. Such a standard would allow an injured rescuer
to recover full damages though they were unreasonable in assessing the
situation as an emergency from the start. This result ought to be avoided.
Furka II explicitly rejects the idea that the rescue doctrine could be
bifurcated so that different standards are applied to perception and
conduct.204 In its discussion of the standard to be applied to the perception
200
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204
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aspect of the rescue doctrine, the court in Furka II cited to an early
application of the rescue doctrine, Wagner v. International R. Co.205 The
Fourth Circuit cites Wagner’s statement that “[t]he law does not ignore
these reactions of the mind in tracing conduct to its consequences. It
recognizes them as normal.”206 It appears that Furka II noted this in an
effort to demonstrate how the perception of an emergency and the
subsequent handling of that emergency are closely linked.
It is true that conduct often quickly follows perception; however,
when this quote from Wagner is considered in the context of the entire
paragraph, rather than in isolation, it is evident that this statement was
made during a discussion of proximate causation and was intended to
mean that it is natural for the plight of another to cause a rescuer to
respond. The sentences directly following the above quote state,
It places [the rescuers’] effects within the range of the natural and
probable. The wrong that imperils life is a wrong to the imperiled
victim; it is a wrong also to his rescuer. The state that leaves an
opening in a bridge is liable to the child that falls into the stream,
but liable also to the parent who plunges to its aid.207

The paragraph ends stating that, “[t]he wrongdoer may not have
foreseen the coming of a deliverer. He is accountable as if he had.”208
Moreover, possibly the most oft quoted line from Wagner, supports the
conclusion that the court focuses its discussion on causation issues. The
famous words, “[d]anger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the
summons of relief,” highlight a causal link in the chain of events.209 The
court’s statements in Wagner highlight the inextricable causal link, and do
not indicate that it is impossible to separately analyze a rescuer’s
perception and a rescuer’s conduct.
While rejecting the possibility of using a bifurcated standard under
the rescue doctrine, the Fourth Circuit in Furka II also notes that rescue
results, “more from the impulse to aid than from any process of thought or
measure of reflection.”210 That is true, and that is why this article’s
proposed standard does not call for deep reflection or certain verification
that an emergency exists, but rather a rescuer’s reasonable belief under the
circumstances that there is an emergency. If the rescue doctrine’s ultimate
policy goal is to facilitate the saving of lives, the law ought to temper the
desire to endorse a wide-variety of rescue techniques, in the hopes of
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saving imperiled persons more often, with the desire to also protect
rescuers from suffering injuries for naught.
Courts have recognized a difference between requiring a reasonable
belief that an emergency exists and actual proof of an emergency. For
example, the Missouri Court of Appeals stated that a certain individual
must face actual danger before another person can justifiably act at his
own risk to avert a casualty.211 The court explained that
[i]t is sufficient if the situation presented is such as to induce a
reasonable belief that some person is in imminent peril. The
intending rescuer may act, with danger to himself if he reasonably
had the right to assume or believe that the life or limb of another
person is in peril.212

Recognizing this distinction makes it easier to clear the rescue
doctrine’s first hurdle—reasonable perception—by accounting for a point
Wagner makes, which is that a rescuer is usually under a great deal of
stress and armed with imperfect knowledge when judging the need for a
rescue. Wyoming and Alabama also consider reasonable belief to
sufficiently satisfy the reasonableness standard as applied to perception.213
Additionally, a reasonable perception standard promotes the just
functioning of the rescue doctrine.214 The rescue doctrine can only work
fairly if it works in a way consistent with proximate causation, which
typically centers on a determination of what is reasonably foreseeable.215
The rescue doctrine is premised on the idea that when a defendant acts
negligently, the defendant can anticipate a rescue attempt.216 This idea
mirrors the preceding discussion of proximate cause in Wagner.217 The
Fourth Circuit in Furka II seriously erred by adopting a reckless or wanton
standard to assess a rescuer’s belief that a rescue attempt is necessary
because that implies that even unreasonable rescue attempts are
foreseeable to a defendant.218 The idea that one must expect people to
intervene and attempt a rescue in a situation that no reasonable person
211
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would consider an emergency is patently unfair and conflicts with general
conceptions of proximate causation. Therefore, reasonableness needs to
be applied to the perception aspect of the rescue doctrine.
D. Good Samaritan Statutes Akin to a Bifurcated Standard
Additionally, numerous states’ Good Samaritan statutes utilize
standards which essentially function the same way that a bifurcated
standard would under the rescue doctrine. For example, Iowa utilizes a
reckless, wanton, or willful conduct standard in its Good Samaritan statute,
while also limiting the extent to which the statute applies through its
inclusion of a handful of other requirements.219 These additional
limitations act similarly to the way in which a reasonable perception
standard would, since they restrict the statute’s scope of protection based
on time, place, and the type of assistance offered.220 The statute states that
in order for a person to be shielded from liability for any civil damages
resulting from that person’s omissions or acts, the person must render
“emergency care or assistance without compensation,” “in good faith,” at
the scene of the emergency, while the victim is being transferred from the
scene of the emergency, or while the victim is at or being transported to
an emergency shelter.221 These requirements all have a reasonableness
theme, confining a rescuer’s liability protection to the time and place when
care is most urgently needed, directly following an accident of some sort
and at the scene of the crisis. Other states also employ similar restrictions
and a reckless conduct standard.222 Most other states employ comparable
restrictions and a gross negligence conduct standard.223 Certain other
states, such as Texas and Nebraska, appear to apply even more forgiving
conduct standards in their Good Samaritan statutes, when examined from
the rescuer’s point of view.224 These statutes further demonstrate the
prevalence of the public policy protecting potential rescuers throughout
the country, and support the idea of a bifurcated standard.
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IV. CONCLUSION
At one end of the standard spectrum, Barlow essentially retired the
maritime rescue doctrine by adopting a reasonable seaman standard. At
the other end of the standard spectrum, Furka II applied a reckless and
wanton standard to all aspects of the maritime rescue doctrine, thereby
allowing rescuer-plaintiffs the chance to recover for injuries sustained
during the course of what no reasonable seaman would consider an
emergency. Neither extreme approach offers the best solution—a
compromise. The maritime rescue doctrine should use a bifurcated
standard: applying a reasonableness standard to the rescuer’s perception
of the situation and a recklessness standard to the rescuer’s conduct. A
bifurcated standard ought to apply to the maritime rescue doctrine
because: it is thematically consistent with the purposes of the Jones Act;
the employees at issue have no independent duty to rescue; and, such a
standard simultaneously comports with the rescue doctrine’s underlying
public policy purpose, and the doctrine’s strong ties to proximate causation
and the reasonably foreseeable. Following any other standard would
simply add insult to a rescuer-plaintiff’s previously sustained injuries.

